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Abstract - We consider the applicability of ID-based cryp-
tography to providing security within a Personal Area Net-
work (PAN). An initialisation process appropriate for use
within a PAN is proposed, and a detailed comparison between
the ID-based approach and a more conventional PKI approach
is given.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One emerging application of wireless technologies is the
so-called Personal Area Network (PAN). It consists of a small
number of devices, often with limited capabilities, that are
physically close and communicate over wireless interfaces
(e.g., Bluetooth). These devices usually belong to the same
owner. A challenging problem in this setting is that of secur-
ing the communications between the devices in the PAN. It is
assumed that the devices do not share any keys.
In this work, we propose one possible solution to the prob-
lem of securing the intra-PAN communications. More specif-
ically, we propose a method for providing authenticated, in-
tegrity protected and private channels between any two de-
vices in the PAN. The solution uses identity-based crypto-
graphic techniques. Our solution is perhaps one of the first
realistic application of identity-based techniques, with certain
advantages over traditional PKI methods.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II we describe the requirements posed by a PAN. In Section
III we describe the main functionality of identity based cryp-
tographic schemes. In Section IV we describe a method for
establishing an authenticated and private channel that is used
for distributing private keys. Finally in Section V we compare
the solution based on identity based techniques to a traditional
PKI solution.
II. REQUIREMENTS
The underlying requirement is for two devices, which do
not share any pre-existing keys, to be able to set up a secure
channel. In this section we identify the requirements that arise
if an ID-based solution is adopted to this problem.
As described below, an ID-based scheme allows public
keys for public key cryptosystems to be reliably distributed
without any need for public key certificates. If such a system
is employed within a PAN, the immediate availability of pub-
lic keys for asymmetric encryption and/or signature schemes
allows a secure channel to be established between any two
PAN devices with the minimum of overhead.
The problem remains of initialising the scheme. As de-
scribed in more detail below, one of the devices within the
PAN is defined as the Private Key Generator, and is responsi-
ble for issuing public domain parameters and a device private
key to every device within the network. This transfer must
provide data integrity and origin authentication — in addi-
tion, confidentiality is required for the private key transfer. A
method by which this can be achieved is described in Sec-
tion IV.
III. IDENTITY BASED SCHEMES
The use of ID-based cryptography presents an interesting
alternative to the use of a conventional PKI solution within
a PAN environment. Whilst ID-based cryptography will not
avert the need for a secure initialisation process, involving a
trusted exchange between a mobile device and a Trusted Third
Party, it will remove the need for any subsequent exchanges
of public key certificates between mobile devices. Moreover,
whilst the trust model for an ID-based system may not always
be appropriate, in a PAN environment the requirement for all
devices to strongly trust one entity does not seem likely to
present a major problem.
The origin of ID-based cryptography goes back to 1984,
when Shamir described the potential utility of an encryption
scheme in which the public key can be an arbitrary string.
The original motivation was to simplify certificate manage-
ment in e-mail systems. In such a scheme, the public key is
derived (using a publicly known function) from the identity
of owner, e.g., from the owner’s e-mail address. According to
the definition in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [6],
an ID-based cryptographic system is an asymmetric system
wherein an entity’s public identification information plays the
role of its public key, and is used as input by a trusted au-
thority (along with the authority’s private key) to compute the
entity’s private key.
A. Identity-Based Encryption
In an ID-based encryption scheme, the encryption and de-
cryption functions have the same functionality as in a tradi-
tional scheme. The only difference is in the key management.
The scheme is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that
device A wants to send a message to device B. It first encrypts
it using, as device B’s public key, a string that is derived from
device B’s identity (e.g., its name or serial number). There is
no need for device A to obtain device B’s public key certifi-
cate, thus simplifying the certificate management.
The role of the CA, however, is not eliminated. The first
time that device B receives an encrypted message (or before),
it has to contact a trusted third party, the Private Key Gener-
ator (PKG), authenticate itself and obtain its private key. The
private key it obtains is valid as long as its public key is valid.
Methods for key revocation are discussed later. ID-based au-
thentication and signature schemes are analogously defined.
Until recently there was a lack of practical and secure ID-
based encryption schemes. However, in the last couple of
years, two promising ID-based encryption schemes have been
proposed, by Boneh and Franklin [1] and Cocks [2].
B. Identity-Based Signatures
ID-based signature schemes are the ID-based analogues of
traditional signature schemes. As expected, if device B wants
to generate a signature, it first contacts the PKG, authenti-
cates itself and obtains the private key. This is then used as
in a traditional scheme to generate a signature. When device
A receives a signed message from device B, it can verify the
signature in a traditional way using device B’s identity infor-
mation as its public key, thus avoiding the use of any cer-
tificates. Satisfactory ID-based signature schemes have been
known since 1986. See for instance [3], [4].
C. Key Revocation
Key revocation in ID-based systems can be done in a very
efficient way by limiting the lifetime of public keys. This can
be achieved by defining the public key to consist not only of
the identity of the owner, but the identity with a date appended
to it. Continuing the previous example, if the public key of
device B is to be renewed once a year, then its public key for
the year 2002 would be “deviceB2002”, and it would have to
obtain a fresh private key once a year. Also, one can add more
granularity to the revocation system by simply adopting a dif-
ferent convention for the public key (e.g., instead of the year
append the month). However, unless the lifetime of public
keys is made very short (with a consequent overhead relating
to the need for new private keys to be distributed very reg-
ularly) one cannot completely avoid Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs). If a public key is revoked due to compromise
of the corresponding private key, then the public key, i.e., the
public identity, has to be added to a CRL.
IV. KEY DISTRIBUTION
The problem of private key distribution and update is a non-
trivial one, as the private keys have to be communicated from
the PKG to the appropriate mobile device via a private and
authenticated channel. In this section, following the propos-
als of Gehrmann and Nyberg, [5], we describe how such a
channel can be established using weak password based tech-
niques.
The protocol that we describe here is an authenticated
Diffie-Hellman protocol. We describe the protocol in terms
of a general group G, and an element g ∈ G. For specific im-
plementations this can be taken to be, for instance, the mul-
tiplicative group of integers modulo a prime or the group of
points on an elliptic curve over a finite field. (The usual care
is required in selecting G and g — see, for example, [6]).
1) The PKG generates a random integer x and sends gx to
the device.
2) The device generates a random integer y and sends gy
to the PKG.
3) The PKG generates a random key K suitable for use
with a MAC function shared by all devices in the PAN.
4) The PKG computes MACK(gx, gy). The MAC and the
key are then output by the device acting as a PKG to the
user (e.g., via a display).
5) The user types the MAC and the key K into the mo-
bile device, and the mobile device then recomputes the
MAC value and compares it with the input value.
6) If the two values match, then both devices can generate
gxy; otherwise, they abort.
We note that even if the keying material for the MAC, and
the MAC itself, are very short (and indeed they have to be
short for reasons of usability), the security of the system is not
compromised. The reason is that these values are used only
to authenticate the exchange of the “Diffie-Hellman” values.
Moreover, the key K is generated after the values gx and gy
have been exchanged, and is entered manually into the mo-
bile device. Thus, an attacker cannot know which values to
substitute for gx and gy in order for the two computed MACs
to match.
After the authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, the mo-
bile device and the PKG share a secret key, which can be used
to establish the authenticated and private channel.
V. COMPARISON
In this section we compare the solution using ID-based
techniques to a solution using traditional PKI. This compari-
son is inevitably provisional since investigations of appropri-
ate protocols for pairing two devices (which could be used
for a simultaneous exchange of public keys) are at an early
stage. Hence this comparison is based on working assump-
tions about the properties of protocols to support and manage
the personal PKI.
For the comparison we use the following measures: Com-
munications complexity (i.e., the number and length of mes-
sages exchanged between a mobile device and the personal
CA/PKG, and/or between a pair of mobile devices), Com-
putational complexity (i.e., the amount of computation that
the various parties need to perform), Management complexity
(i.e., the management overhead for the particular operations),
and the Overall security level (i.e., the strength and trust prop-
erties of the security mechanisms).
• Communications complexity. The personal PKI ap-
proach requires more bandwidth, as public key cer-
tificates have to be distributed to the members of the
PAN. For interactive communications, this distribu-
tion may not require more messages (certificates may
be attached to other messages) but they certainly make
some messages lengthier. For connectionless commu-
nications, such as email, the advantage offered by ID-
based schemes is even more significant, as the sender
needs to obtain the certificate of the receiver in advance
(which implies one request and one reply message). On
the other hand, the distribution of private keys by the
PKG in the ID-based approach requires an authenticated
and private channel (as opposed to simply an authenti-
cated channel in the traditional approach). This clearly
complicates matters.
• Computational complexity. The main computations in
both schemes come from key generation, and computa-
tions involving the key, e.g., signature generation, sig-
nature verification, and encryption. Key generation is
of approximately the same complexity in both schemes.
One possible advantage of the ID-based scheme is that
all the keys are generated by the PKG, which may be
considerably more powerful than the other devices in
the PAN. Once the keys have been generated and dis-
tributed to the interested parties, the computations are
again of approximately the same complexity. More pre-
cisely, ID-based signature generation and verification is
done in exactly the same way as in traditional schemes,
and are thus of the same computational complexity. En-
cryption on the other hand is slightly slower for ID-based
schemes, as it involves operations on elliptic curves. We
stress however, that public key encryption is very rarely
performed, as one establishes shared secret keys, and
uses them to encrypt messages. By far the most fre-
quent public key operations are signature generation and
verification, which as mentioned above, are of the same
complexity as in traditional schemes.
• Management complexity. In both schemes there is a need
for maintaining keys (preserving their integrity and/or
privacy), and checking for the validity of public keys be-
fore using them. A solution such as certificate revoca-
tion lists is therefore unavoidable in both cases. In the
ID-based approach (in principle) one can avoid public
key certificates, thus reducing the complexity of manag-
ing the system. Even in ID-based systems, however, a
device still has to know the current identity of the device
it wants to communicate with. Depending on how this
problem is solved, the above observation is of greater or
lesser significance.
• Overall security level. The cryptographic primitives in
both schemes provide the same security level. A disad-
vantage of the ID-based encryption schemes of Boneh-
Franklin and Cocks (the only practical such schemes), is
that they have only been known for a short time, and the
underlying assumptions have not yet been sufficiently
tested. Therefore, it is possible that the schemes are
not as strong as they were initially thought to be. Inter-
estingly, ID-based digital signature schemes have been
known for almost as long as traditional schemes. An-
other issue with ID-based schemes is that of the trust
placed in the PKG. The device acting as a PKG has ac-
cess to all private keys, and therefore has to trusted by all
devices in the PAN. However, given that the PAN will
typically consist of devices owned by a single individual,
the trust issue is probably not a significant one.
We summarise the comparison in the following table.
ID-based Traditional
Communications Complexity + –
Computational Complexity same same
Management Complexity + –
Overall security same same
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